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Abstract
With the more and more extensive application of blockchain, blockchain secu-
rity has been widely concerned by the society and deeply studied by scholars.
Moreover, the security of blockchain data directly affects the security of various
applications of blockchain. In this survey, we perform a comprehensive clas-
sification and summary of the security of blockchain data. First, we present
classification of blockchain data attacks. Subsequently, we present the attacks
and defenses of blockchain data in terms of privacy, availability, integrity and
controllability. Data privacy attacks present data leakage or data obtained by
attackers through analysis. Data availability attacks present abnormal or incor-
rect access to blockchain data. Data integrity attacks present blockchain data
being tampered. Data controllability attacks present blockchain data acciden-
tally manipulated by smart contract vulnerability. Finally, we present several
important open research directions to identify follow-up studies in this area.
Keywords: Security; Privacy; Blockchain; Consensus; Smart Contract
1. Introduction
Blockchain [1] technology combines multiple computer technologies such as
encryption, distributed storage, consensus, Peer to Peer (P2P) network, and
smart contracts [2]. These key technologies make blockchain open, secure, trust
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and smart. Moreover, these techniques allow transactions to be continuously
linked to blockchain. Blockchain records all transactions and historical data
by establishing a jointly maintained and untampered database. Internet users
who do not know each other can reach a credit agreement through smart con-
tracts, point-to-point ledger, or digital encryption without any central trust
[3]. Thereby blockchain has attracted extensive research attention from various
industries [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
With the development of blockchain applications, the security of blockchain
data is particularly important, and it is the fundamental enabling factors of
many blockchain applications. Currently, attackers use the characteristics of the
blockchain itself to conduct various attacks on the blockchain data, which makes
the blockchain data face various threats. (1) The openness of blockchain data
exposes users’ privacy. Attackers can find the relationship between addresses
through transactions [10]. (2) Network attacks cause abnormal or incorrect
access to blockchain data, which undermine the availability of the blockchain
data. A Bitcoin address can be associated with an Internet protocol (IP) ad-
dress; therefore, Attackers can track the correspondence among addresses, users
and real identity [11, 12]. (3) Blockchain data will be tampered if an attacker
passes an attack on the blockchain consensus mechanism. Blockchain is also vul-
nerable to selfish mining attacks [13, 14, 15]. These undermine the integrity of
blockchain data. (4) Smart contract vulnerabilities can cause serious problems
by making blockchain data not controlled by users [16]. In addition to these
enumerated problems, there are many other security threats in blockchain, such
as mining pool attacks [13] and miner attacks [17]. These threats seriously
affect the data security of blockchain, which threatens the related blockchain
applications.
There are some recent surveys about blockchain security. Gervais et al. [18]
surveyed security and adversarial strategies of proof of work (PoW). Atzei et
al. [19] and Luu et al. [16] investigated the vulnerabilities of smart contracts.
However, these surveys focused on the security and privacy of a certain aspect of
blockchain. Li et al. [20] summarized some cases of attacks against blockchain
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1.0 and 2.0. However, their article lacks systematic description and categoriza-
tion of threats and countermeasures. With the rapid development of blockchain,
many new threats and countermeasures have emerged, and up-to-date research
is needed to meet the needs of blockchain development.
Our paper summarizes and analyzes the security of blockchain data. We
present the attacks and defenses of blockchain data in terms of the privacy, avail-
ability, integrity and controllability. Data privacy attacks include the threats of
transaction and identity privacy. Data availability attacks include the threats
brought by network traceability and eclipse attacks. Data integrity attacks
include the threats brought by double-spending, selfish mining, and block with-
holding attacks. Data controllability attacks include the vulnerabilities of smart
contracts. We present corresponding countermeasures for the threats for each
type of attack.
Our main contributions include the following:
• We created a comprehensive classification and summary of the security of
blockchain data.
• We present the attacks and defenses of blockchain data in terms of the
privacy, availability, integrity and controllability.
• We describe attacks and defenses in a contrastive way. According to
blockchain data security features, we present the attack mechanism and
the countermeasures. We present the evolution of the attacks and coun-
termeasures.
• We discuss research hotspots and present several future research direc-
tions.
The rest of this paper includes: In section 2, we introduces classification of
attacks. In section 3, we present blockchain data challenges. In sections 4, we
present corresponding solutions. Finally, we present research directions for the
future in section 5 and summarize our survey in section 6.
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Table 1: Classification of Blockchain Attacks
Data privacy attacks
Transaction privacy attacks Identity privacy attacks
[10, 21, 22] [10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28]
Data availability attacks
Network traceability attacks Eclipse attacks
[31, 32, 33, 11, 12] [34, 35, 12, 36, 37, 38, 39]
Data integrity attacks
Double-spending attacks Selfish mining attacks
Block withhold-
ing attacks
[40, 41, 25, 37, 43, 44] [15, 45, 46, 47, 48]
[17, 15, 45, 49,
50]
Data controllability attacks
Logic problems
Semantic misunderstand-
ings
Design prob-
lems verifier’s
dilemma
Privacy
preservation
[51] [16] [52] [53, 54]
2. Classification of Blockchain Attacks
As previously mentioned, the security of blockchain data is mainly divided
into four aspects: privacy, availability, integrity, and controllability. Each aspect
contains several attacks, as shown in Table 1. Data privacy attacks refer to
data leakage or data obtained by attackers through analysis. In this aspect,
we present the threats of transaction and identity privacy. Data availability
attacks refer to abnormal or incorrect access to blockchain data. In this aspect,
we present the threats brought by network traceability and eclipse attacks. Data
integrity attacks refer to blockchain data being tampered. In this aspect, we
present the threats brought by double-spending, mining pool, and miner attacks.
Data controllability attacks refer to blockchain data accidentally manipulated
by smart contract vulnerability. In this aspect, we present the vulnerabilities of
smart contracts.
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Figure 1: Bitcoin transactions schematic diagram.
3. Blockchain Data Attacks
3.1. Data Privacy Attacks
Using the transaction process of Bitcoin as an example, we can analyze the
threats and corresponding solutions of blockchain data. In Bitcoin, every trans-
action is traceable. A transaction output is the input to another transaction,
thus forming a transaction chain. Based on the chain of transactions, the analyst
can obtain the use of any coins and the relevant transactions of any address.
As shown in Figure 1, an example illustrates the simple transaction process,
assuming that Alice launched transaction A, Bob launched transaction B, and
Mike launched transaction C. The relationship of transaction input and output
is as shown in the figure.
Potential attackers can analyze users’ transaction and identity privacy by
analyzing transaction records, as shown in Figure 2.
3.1.1. Transaction Privacy Attacks
The transaction input comes from the output of another transaction. Based
on the blockchain of transactions, analysts can obtain the following information:
• The Use of Bitcoin: The Bitcoin came from the mining process, which was
first recorded in the miners’ mining address and then transferred to other
addresses. Both mining and transaction information will be recorded in
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Figure 2: Data privacy attacks.
the global ledger. Therefore, by analyzing these public data, an attacker
can acquire all transactions of any Bitcoin.
• The Blockchain Transaction Addresses: Each blockchain transaction de-
tails the information of all the input and output addresses.
Therefore, analysts can obtain the following information:
• Finding Bitcoin Relations between Different Addresses: The transfer of
the coins between accounts reflects the relationship between accounts.
Reid and Harrigan [10] analyzed the accounts published by WikiLeaks
and tallied the balances , Bitcoin sources and flows of the Bitcoin ad-
dresses published on the WikiLeaks website. The paper also analyzed a
stolen address in Bitcoin and found the five closest addresses to the theft
address, revealing the pre- and post-theft Bitcoin flows.
• Tracking Special Transactions: We can monitor the transaction informa-
tion of special transactions involving large or suspected malicious acts such
as theft, and further trace the flow of Bitcoins through continuous obser-
vation. Liao et al. [21] showed the attack of CryptoLocker that extorts
Bitcoin by encrypting the victim’s files. The authors studied the relation
transactions of public Bitcoin ransomware addresses. 968 addresses that
belong to the organization were found, and ransom transactions worth
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1128.40 BTC were identified. This information assists in determining the
identity of the criminals.
• Discovering the Rule of Transactions: The Rule of Transactions can reveal
the relationship between transactions. Ron and Shamir [22] focused on
the transactions statistics. They traced 364 transactions of more than
50,000 BTC and studied the transactions rules for a transaction of 90,000
BTC . The authors found that the large transactions used a variety of
methods to disperse Bitcoins to different addresses. These transaction
modes include long chains, fork-merge patterns and self-loops, keeping
Bitcoins in saving accounts, binary tree-like distributions.
3.1.2. Identity Privacy Attacks
There are many clues and side information in blockchain transactions, and
it is possible to use these clues and side information to speculate about the
identity privacy.
The architecture of Bitcoin can be revealed the following:
• Multiple Input Addresses belong to the same person or organization. The
multiple input transactions are initiated by the same user because each
input in a multi-input transaction requires a separate signature [10, 21, 22].
• Multiple Output Addresses in the same Coinbase [25] transaction belong to
the same user set. Many miners want to increase their income by joining
one mining pool where they participate in collective mining. All miner
addresses involved in mining are recorded as the Coinbase transaction
output.
• Input Addresses and Change Address belong to the same user. The change
address is generated by the Bitcoin system, which save the change Bitcoins
in one transaction [26]. The features of the change address include the
following: the status of the output address is usually only once, the change
address only belongs to the transaction input or output in one transaction;
and only change address cannot appear in the output address.
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The first clues and side information are due to the design of Bitcoin itself.
By using these clues and side information, analysts can discover the correlation
between different addresses and reduce the anonymity of blockchain addresses.
Meiklejohn et al. [27] used heuristic analysis to analyze transaction data in the
blockchain to identify the same user’s different addresses. They analyzed the
public addresses of Silk Road and the addresses associated with some theft cases
and found many related addresses. Zhao et al. [28] proposed a clustering process
for Bitcoin transaction data. Based on the analysis of 35,587,286 addresses in
the global ledger of Bitcoin, there were 13,062,822 different users.
The second clues and side information is the following:
• Transaction Characteristics: The transaction characteristics are usually
related to the actual transaction processes. Many transaction behaviors
have their own characteristics in daily life [23]. For example, transactions
at breakfast stores often occur in the morning, and the transaction amount
is set at one to 20 coins. The gas station transaction time is an average,
but the transaction amount is concentrated in a few specific values, i.e.,
100 coins, 200 coins, or full price (changes based on the change of oil price
have universal regularity).
• Transaction Rules: Each user has a different transaction behavior. Monaco
[24] analyzed the transaction parameters, and then proposed a method
based on parameter identification.
3.2. Data Availability Attacks
The main threat of data availability is to make abnormal or incorrect access
to blockchain data.
3.2.1. Network Traceability Attacks
In Bitcoin network, IP address, topology, and transmission information can
be obtained by attackers. Based on this information, the analyst can analyze
user identity privacy. Each network node is connected to many other nodes
8
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Figure 3: Transaction traceability mechanism diagram.
through the P2P network, and the connection relationship between these nodes
can be analyzed. [29, 30].
Transaction traceability is to estimate the transaction propagation path ac-
cording to the time order that the different nodes send the transaction to arrive
at the probe, as shown in Figure 3. Ideally, the originating node is the earliest to
arrive at the probe, the neighbor arrives at the neighbor second, and the order
the next n−th neighboring nodes arrive at the probe will increase with distance.
In the actual environment, the time order of different nodes’ transmitted trans-
actions arriving at probes is affected by many factors, such as network delay
and delay transmitting strategy, and the transactions transmitted by the long-
distance nodes may arrive earlier. To accurately analyze the matching degree
of transaction ranking and node network topology, we will consider a variety of
influencing factors and calculate the trading order accuracy.
Network traceability technology uses the collection of Bitcoin network trans-
missions of information to analyze the transmission path of Bitcoin transactions
in the network, then tracks the transaction-generated server IP information.
This technology can directly contact an anonymous transaction via the trade
originating node’s IP address to permit traceability. However, the existing net-
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work traceability technology has a low accuracy and generally needs additional
computing and storage resources; therefore, it is less practical.
Bitcoin users can make double-sided transactions of Bitcoin tokens by cre-
ating Bitcoin transactions with other users on servers anywhere in the world
[31, 32, 33]. Since the transaction does not require the participation of third
parties, and the addresses used by both parties in the transaction are anony-
mous, the real identity of the Bitcoin traders is hard to find.
Transaction traceability technology desires to track the transmission path of
Bitcoin transactions in the network to find the originating node of a transaction,
which is the first server node of the transaction in the Bitcoin network. Once
a Bitcoin transaction is associated with the IP address of the originating node,
the anonymous account number in the transaction can be associated with the
user identity, which helps to identify the identity information of the malicious
trader and analyze the flow of the Bitcoin funds.
Network traceability technology is to analyze the transaction information
transmitted by the Bitcoin network, locate the propagation path of a specific
transaction, and then infer the origin node of the transaction.
Koshy et al. [11] analyzed the patterns of Bitcoin transactions in the network
and found that we can search for the origin node by using the special transaction
mode. For example, a transaction that is transmitted only by one node is
usually due to a problem with the transaction format, then this transaction
is transmitted only once by the originating node. However, the effect of this
method is limited due to the small proportion of all transactions in the special
transaction mode (less than 9% of the special transactions in the paper trial).
Biryukov et al. [12] analyzed transaction traceability using neighbor nodes.
By using neighbor nodes as the basis for judgment, the accuracy of traceability
can be improved. However, the solution must continuously send information to
all the nodes in the Bitcoin network, which may cause serious interference to
the Bitcoin network and is less practical.
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3.2.2. Eclipse Attacks
Heilman et al. [34] described eclipse attack, which exploits the broadcast
features of P2P networks to attack. The attacker controls the reception and
transmission of all information of the victim node, causing the victim node’s
inbound connection to the illegal node.
The attack node maliciously fills the victim node’s routing table before the
victim node of the blockchain restarts, forcing the victim node to restart and
establish an outgoing connection with the attack address in the routing table [34]
[35]. At the same time, the attack node continuously establishes an incoming
connection with the victim node. Eventually, the channel of the monopolistic
victim node is reached, and the purpose of its information flow is controlled
so that it can only receive useless or even malicious information sent by the
attack node. If the attack node can successfully implement eclipse attacks on
more nodes, it can control the blockchain channel and information flow of more
nodes, and gradually control most of the blockchain networks. Attackers can
even launch 51% attacks and double-spending attacks on this basis, causing
more serious consequences.
The eclipse attack process is usually divided into four steps, as shown in
Figure 4 and detailed as follows:
• Populating Tried and New Tables: The blockchain node is capable of re-
ceiving the addresses of the unsolicited incoming connections and the un-
solicited ADDR message. The addresses of the incoming connections will
be stored in the tried table, and the addresses contained in the ADDR
message can be inserted directly into the new table. The nodes will not
test the addresses’ connectivity. Therefore, when the attack nodes are
connected to the victim node through the attack addresses, the attack
node can send an ADDR message containing a lot of “trash” IP addresses
that will gradually overwrite all legal addresses of the new table. The
nodes rarely get network information from their neighbor nodes and DNS
seeders. Therefore, when an attacker overwrites the tried and new tables
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Figure 4: Eclipse attack flow diagram.
of the victim node, the victim node almost never verifies its authenticity
by querying a legitimate peer or sower.
• Restarting the Victim: The victim node will be restarted by the eclipse
attack. After the node is restarted, the victim node can be connected
to the attack addresses. The reasons for the Bitcoin node restart include:
ISP shutdown, machine shutdown, operating system upgrade of the mining
machine, etc [12, 36, 37, 38, 39].
• Selecting Outgoing Connections: After the victim node is restarted, if the
address is selected from the new table to establish an outgoing connection,
all connections fail. Therefore, the victim node is forced to only pick the
addresses from the tried table. Because the victim node prefers to choose
the updated addresses, all the outgoing connections of the victim node are
connected to the attack addresses.
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Table 2: Some other Attacks that may be caused by an Eclipse Attack
Reference Attacks Description
[40, 41, 25, 43, 37, 44]
Double-spending
threat
Using the same cryptocurrency in mul-
tiple transactions by a sender
[15, 45, 46, 47, 48] Selfish mining attack
Hiding the excavated blocks to cause
the chain to fork
[15, 45, 17, 49, 50]
Block withholding at-
tack
The attacker never submits any blocks
• Monopolizing the Eclipsed Victim: If the above attack is successful, The
attacker must control all incoming connections to the victim node in order
to truly monopolize the victim node.
In addition, the eclipse attack will also cause other attacks. The main attacks
are shown in Table 2, the details of the attacks will be described in detail in
section 5.
3.3. Data Integrity Attacks
Data integrity attacks primarily include double-spending, selfish mining, and
block withholding attacks.
3.3.1. Double-Spending Attacks
Double-spending attacks refer to the use of the same cryptocurrency in mul-
tiple transactions by a sender. Bitcoins use the PoW system, which has approxi-
mately ten minutes of confirmation time between blocks. Therefore, an attacker
will implement a the attack in this time interval. In addition, if the attacker
has a significant amount of computational power, he or she will be more likely
to successfully perform the attack.
Double-spending attack is a unique attack on the bitcoin system that falls
into two types:
• Attacker Used the same Bitcoin to Trade with multiple Users at the same
Time: If these trading users complete the transaction without the transac-
13
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tion being recorded in the legal blockchain, the attacker achieves the goal
of double spending or even multiple spending [37, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Although
in the multiple transactions launched by the attacker, only one transac-
tion is considered legal and recorded in the blockchain, the transaction
has been completed and the attacker has benefited from the attack.
• Attacker Used his own Computing Power to Launch an Attack: The at-
tacker used the same Bitcoin to trade both transaction A and transaction
B with two users. If the transactions A is confirmed to be recorded in the
blockchain, transaction A is completed. Because the attacker has a pow-
erful computing power, he records transaction B in the private blockchain
and mines a longer chain than the legal one, prompting transaction B to
be confirmed and completing transaction B [44].
Ghassan et al. [43] analyzed the double-spending threat of Bitcoin in the
fast payment scenario. Figure 5 illustrates the attack model. We assume that
the attacker A must pay BTCs to a vendor V , and A creates the transaction
TXv to V . Simultaneously, to realize double-spending, A creates another trans-
action TXa that has the same BTCs as those involved in TXv’s inputs. The
successful implementation of a double-spending attack must meet the following
three requirements:
• TRv is added to V ’s wallet.
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• TRa is confirmed in the blockchain.
• V ’s service time is less than the time when V detects the wrong behavior.
In fact, because of the PoW mechanism, it usually takes ten minutes to pre-
vent double-spending attacks, so it does not apply to quick payment scenarios.
Additionally, without a suitable detection mechanism, double-spending attacks
can be implemented in a low-cost manner.
3.3.2. Selfish Mining Attacks
Selfish mining attack [15] is a typical attack on blockchain. A cryptocurrency
like Bitcoin requires a high computing power to solve the cryptographic problem
for a miner, so the mining becomes very difficult. In view of this, a group of
miners (or mining pools) are usually combined with each other and share the
rewards after successfully solving the password problem. This helps individual
miners produce more continuous and constant income when mining alone.
Eyal et al. [15] proposed that if there is a group of selfish miners who
use selfish mining strategies and succeed, it may invalidate the work of honest
miners. A malicious mining pool does not publish the blocks it finds and creates
a fork. Therefore, there are public chain maintained by honest miners and the
private fork by malicious mining pools. Since the fork is the longest chain in
the current network, it will be recognized as a legal chain by honest miners.
Therefore, the original public chain and the honest data it contains will be
discarded. The results of the study show that usually the selfish mining strategy
will get more benefits. At the same time, the analysis shows that if the selfish
pool exceeds one third of the total net, the existing protocol will no longer be
safe.
Courtois et al. [45] conducted experimental simulation and theoretical anal-
ysis of selfish mining. The results show that the computational waste of Bitcoin
is minimal, and it is even decreasing over time. Sapirshtein et al. [46] studied the
optimal strategy of the selfish-mining underlying model. Nayak et al. [47] shows
when this attack is combined with an eclipse attack, these strategies sometimes
15
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result in a gain of 30% depending on the different parameters. Carlsten et al.
[48] proposed a more complex selfish mining strategy that led to uneven returns
and exceeded default mining and traditional selfish mining. Once deployed,
the attack will be profitable, which could result in 51% of attacks or consensus
failures.
3.3.3. Block withholding Attack
Block withholding attack [17] is one of the typical attacks on blockchain.
In the attack, some malicious attackers who have joined the joint mining pool
do not have any mining blocks, which reduces the revenue of the mining pool
and wastes the computing power provided by other miners. This kind of attack
is also called sabotage attack. Usually, the malicious miners will not have any
benefit. The blocker attack will cause different losses to the miners and mining
pools, and the mining pools’ losses are relatively large compared to the miners’
low cost. As a result, block withholding attack is more common in competing
mining pools and less common in miners [15]. Block withholding attack diagram
is shown in Figure 6.
Courtois et al. [45] analyzed the actual examples and found that the main
hazard of the malicious miners who can profit from this attack is to waste
the computing resources of the mining pools and reduce the income of the
mining pools. Eyal [49] analyzed the game of miners’ dilemmas, and there
16
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is a balance between competing mining pools, which makes miners repeatedly
choose whether to attack. Kwon et al. [50] extended the BWH attack [49] and
proposed a new attack method called fork after withholding (FAW) attack. The
attack uses selfish mining attacks based on BWH attacks. The FAW attacks’
frequency is four times as often as BWH attacks, and the attack will also gain
an additional 56%. In addition, the research showed that when two pools attack
each other, the more computing power, the easier it is to win.
3.4. Data Controllability Attacks
Smart contracts are blockchain-based programs that directly control digital
assets. Additionally, it is executed automatically by a computer system. Nick
Saab [51] indicates that smart contracts are essentially a recognized tool for
forming relationships between individuals, institutions and property, i.e., a set of
agreements that form relationships and reach consensus. Smart contracts work
similar to if-then statements. When a predefined trigger condition is reached,
the smart contract is executed.
The most significant feature of smart contracts based on Ethereum is Turing
completeness. Smart contracts are written into the blockchain in the form of
digitization, which is protected by the blockchain. The entire process of storing,
reading and executing by the characteristics of blockchain is transparent and
traceable and cannot be changed. If a user wants to modify a smart contract,
he or she must control at least 51% of the calculation power.
The input to a smart contract includes transactions and events. The transac-
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tions mainly include transaction data, and the events refer to the description of
the transactions. Smart contracts are triggered when conditions are met. Smart
contracts exist to allow a complex set of digitized promises with triggering con-
ditions to be properly executed according to the wishes of the participants, as
shown in Figure 7.
Table 3: Smart Contract Vulnerability Summary
Reference Classification Description
[51]
Errors in encoding state ma-
chines
Coins may not be returned.
[51] Failing to use cryptography
Attackers can adjust their input ac-
cording to the user’s input.
[51] Misaligned incentives
The second user will no longer have any
action (i.e., no reward) when he feels he
may have failed.
[51] Ethereum-specific mistakes The problem causes some bugs.
[16]
Transaction-ordering depen-
dence
If the transaction verification order is
different, the execution result is differ-
ent.
[16] Timestamp dependence
Miners can attempt different times-
tamps in advance to calculate the win-
ning value, to award the prize to the
winners they desire.
[16] Mishandled exceptions
If there is an error during the call, it
will return to the pre-contract state.
[16] Reentrancy vulnerability
The new chain is broadcast to the old
chain, and the transaction is still suc-
cessful, resulting in confusion.
[52]
Resource exhaustion attack
by problem givers
The miners were unable to mine the
next block, causing damage to the min-
ers.
[52]
Incorrect transaction attack
by provers
The user not only wastes his or her re-
ward but also does not receive a correct
answer.
[53] Data feed
An attacker could gain valuable infor-
mation by analyzing the transaction
history.
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Smart contracts maximize open source and solve the trust issues of tradi-
tional SAAS services. Developers can validate the code’s original code through
compilation to prove the code’s usability. Therefore, smart contracts are applied
in various fields such as housing leasing, savings insurance, financial lending, and
probation.
However, smart contracts solve the contradiction between the openness and
security of the code, currently, there remain other security privacy issues. A
smart contract vulnerability summary is shown in Table 3 and Figure 8.
In the aspect of the programming of smart contracts [51], if the contract
itself has a logic trap, the execution result of the smart contract can be changed
through certain trigger conditions to generate the result that is beneficial to the
developer. Semantic misunderstandings [16] may occur during the execution of
a smart contract deployed at Ethereum, inconsistent with the notion of a smart
contract written by the original developer, causing the result to deviate from
the expected performance. Incentives designed for smart contracts [52] may
create a verifier’s dilemma where honest miners choose to continue verifying
or mining to get rewarded when faced with the more difficult task of verifying
transactions. For the data privacy protection of smart contracts, the privacy
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protection of data [53] and an authenticated data feed [54] are elaborated. We
will detail each threat and its corresponding security method in a later section.
After detailing each of the attacks in Table 3, we develop a solution (except for
privacy reasons, because they have no vulnerabilities to attack).
3.4.1. Logic Problems of Smart Contracts
Delmolino et al. [51] gathered smart contracts written by students, and
there are many security issues in the design process. The security of smart
contracts is very important in the process of programming them. Even if some
malicious miners exist, they will not increase their own profits. They search
bugs of contracts, and there will be security pitfalls, although the design and
implementation of the contract is very simple. This contract mainly consists of
two parts, one for each player to input his or her own results and the other for
the contract to determine the winner and send him or her the award.
• Errors in Encoding State Machines: During the game between the two
players, the contract may contain some mistakes. If there is a third player
to send coins to in the contract, no one’s coins will be returned. Even
a cautious player cannot avoid this situation. Since developers do not
fully consider the status of the execution of each step of the contract or
clearly define the clear conversion between the states in the programming
of smart contracts, these problems arise.
• Plaintext transmission: Players send their inputs in plaintext in smart
contracts is a serious problem. Because the transactions are transmitted
through plaintext, malicious players only need to intercept other people’s
inputs first and adjust their input results according to other players’ inputs
to maximize their profits.
• Misaligned Incentives: Once a player believes that he or she will lose the
game, the player may choose not to continue to send any further messages,
thus refusing to pay the winner’s rewards and protecting his or her own
interests.
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• Ethereum-specific Mistakes
– Call-stack Bug: In EVM, there are three locations for data stor-
age, the stack, temporary memory, and permanent memory. Among
them, the stack is the only free data storage area; other areas must
pay for gas. However, there are some issues that may arise when using
the stack. When the stack depth exceeds a certain limit (Ethereum
specifies a stack limit of 1024), a stack overflow will occur, and the
caller of the contract will have a loss of property.
– Blockhash Bug: In Ethereum, block.prevhash instruction is used only
to calculate the hash value of the 256 recent blocks.
– Incentive Bugs: There are some incentive bugs in Ethereum, for ex-
ample, selecting the winner of the election by using a hash of the
block as a random beacon. However, miners can selectively withhold
blocks to deviate from this value to gain an unfair advantage. If min-
ers mine a new block, they can check whether they win. If they do
not win, the miners will keep this block until next block is generated;
then, they will receive a second chance to see if they win the game.
– Other Bugs: One of the important issues that must be considered
when designing a smart contract is scalability, as contractual up-
grades are inevitable. In EVM, code is completely unmodifiable and
it is impossible to load and execute code in memory. The code and
data are completely separated. Currently, the upgrade can only be
achieved by deploying a new contract, which may require copying all
the code in the original contract and redirecting the old contract to
the new contract address. Patching the contract or partially upgrad-
ing the contract code in EVM is completely impossible.
3.4.2. Semantic Misunderstandings of Smart Contracts
Luu et al. [16] documented several several vulnerability in Ethernet smart
contracts. These defects refer to differences between the author’s design and
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actual semantics. We introduce the following four types of security issues and
countermeasures:
• Transaction-Ordering Dependence: The vulnerability is that the order of
transaction validation affects the execution result of intelligent contracts.
If the transaction verification order is different, the execution result is dif-
ferent. The attacker provided a smart contract with a prize wager and
promised generous rewards when the user determined the correct solu-
tion. When the user submits the answer and the transaction has not been
verified, the attacker will initiate another transaction, making the trans-
action’s reward value infinitely close to zero. At this point, two unverified
transactions appear in the pool. When the miners verify the transac-
tions, the user’s transaction that answers the question after verifying the
attacker’s transaction has the user’s rewards significantly reduced; the
attacker seldom pays any bonuses to obtain the right answer. In addi-
tion, attackers can make miners prioritize their transactions by increasing
transaction fees.
• Timestamp Dependence: The Ethereum states that when the timestamp
of a new block generated by the miners is greater than that of the last
block and the time difference between the two is less than 900 seconds,
the new block is considered valid and its timestamp is legal. Timestamp
dependency refers to the implementation of smart contracts that depend
on the current timestamp; the results of the execution timestamps vary. If
there is a lottery contract, the winning value is calculated from the current
timestamp and other variables that are known in advance, and the same
code as the lucky number will be awarded. At this point, in the process of
mining, miners can attempt different timestamps in advance to calculate
the winning value, to award the prize to the winner they desire.
• Mishandled Exceptions: Ethereum use the send tool to call a contract or
call the contract function directly. If there is an error during the call, it
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will return to the pre-contract state. King of the Ether Throne (KoET)
is an Ethereum contract that will make you a king or queen, might grant
you riches, and will immortalize your name. A user can become the new
king by paying a certain amount of ether; part of the ether will be used to
pay the previous king’s remuneration. In the transfer process of the ether,
the smart contract did not check the payment results of the transaction,
and once the contract call exception occurs, the incumbent kings may also
lose their throne and compensation.
• Reentrancy Vulnerability: Traditional reentrancy attacks refer to the sit-
uations in which an attacker sends a packet that has been received by
the destination host to achieve deception. While a reentrancy attack on
the blockchain is a transaction that has been verified on a chain reap-
pearing on another chain for verification, this attack usually occurs when
the blockchains are permanently divergent. The famous TheDao hack,
because of the inaccuracy of the intelligent contract code, led to a large
vulnerability in the transaction funds. Although permanent divergence
is used during a later period, there will be reentrancy attacks. The new
chain is broadcast to the old chain, and the transaction is still successful,
resulting in confusion.
3.4.3. Design Problems of Smart Contracts
Luu et al. [52] presented the verifier’s dilemma, which states that verifiers
would make a choice between mining or transaction verification. When the
transactions are expensive, miners will decide to bypass their verification and
mine to ensure their own profits. As a result, miners are vulnerable to resource
depletion or incorrect transaction attacks.
• Resource Exhaustion Attacks by Problem Givers: Honest miners verify
new transactions in accordance with the protocols. Therefore, attackers
can broadcast a very large number of transactions, causing other miners
to waste a significant amount of calculation power to verify the correctness
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of the transaction. To prevent this, Ethereum establishes a gas (consump-
tion) mechanism. Each transaction requires a gas limit and a gas price.
Gas limit is the maximum amount of Gas consumption allowed by this
transaction. Gas price is a tip. If the user does not have sufficient Ether
to pay the maximum cost of his or her own settings, the transaction is
considered invalid, the previously changed state will be restored, and the
consumed gas will not be returned to the user. However, the gas mecha-
nism cannot prevent this scenario. The new block is mined by the attacker.
Then, the attacker broadcasts their expensive transactions. Even if the
attacker pays considerable transaction fees for the deal, because the fees
will be given to the miners who mine a new block regardless of the num-
ber of transaction fees, the transaction fees will be returned to attacker’s
account.
• Incorrect Transaction Attack by Provers: When a user asks for a solution
to a difficult problem, malicious respondents may provide an incorrect so-
lution, because the transaction verification requires a significant amount of
calculation power; therefore, the majority of miners will selectively bypass
verification of this transaction, believe it to be correct, and then broad-
cast it directly to the network, so that the user not only wastes his or her
reward but also does not receive the correct answer.
Through these two attacks, it is found that if the malicious miners mine a
new block, they can attack without considering the reward. When users create
a scale of transactions such as block size, Bitcoin can be repaired through pre-
defined standard transactions, but there is no such restriction in Ethereum.
They presented a safety model that ensures that the miners who did not perform
the agreement received minor rewards, and the honest miners who verified the
transaction were not affected by the malicious miners.
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3.4.4. Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
The global ledger that stores transaction information is public. An attacker
could gain valuable information by analyzing the transaction history, including
the specific account balance of funds, transaction details, and the flow of specific
funds.
4. Blockchain Data Security Protection
4.1. Data Privacy Protection
To ensure the reliability, non-falsification and distributed consistency of the
transaction, a special data structure and consensus mechanism are designed.
These mechanisms ensure the maintenance of a uniform, high public trust ac-
count in distributed untrusted network nodes; however, these mechanisms also
lead to privacy risks. The full ledger not only leaks data privacy but also leaks
the relation between the traders who are behind the data and the identity pri-
vacy [10, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Therefore, the focus of data privacy protection is to
hide the data and the information behind it as much as possible.
We classify different protection mechanisms according to the database pri-
vacy protection classification methods, as the following:
4.1.1. Data Distortion
Because the blockchain ledger is public, the attacker can find the relationship
of the transaction data; the attacker can then infer the transaction and identity
privacy. To prevent this attack, we can adopt a method called mixed coin [67]
without changing the transaction results; however, this method adds confusion,
as shown in Figure 9. Assuming that Alice, Bob, and Mike have transaction
addresses Alice1, Bob1, and Mike1, respectively. In the process of mixing coins,
first to generate new addresses Alice2, Bob2, and Mike2 for them, then to send
the coins that need to be traded to them, mix the coins by the mixed addresses
Mix1, Mix2, and Mix3 and output them to these new addresses Alice2, Bob2,
and Mike2, so that others can’t grasp the source of these coins.
The mixed coin mechanism is classified as follows.
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Figure 9: Bitcoin mixing service diagram.
• The Mixed Coin Scheme based on a Central Node:
This scheme utilizes third-party nodes for mixing coins, and the process
of mixing coins is done at a third-party node. These methods can improve
the security of Bitcoin and other digital currencies without additional
technology [68, 69, 70]. However, Its defects include:
– Additional Charge and Mixed Coin with a Slower Speed: A mixed coin
service node usually charges a fee. As the mixes increase, the cost
rises sharply. The usual delay time is 48 hours, and the transaction
costs are between one and three percent.
– Risk of Theft: In this scheme, the third-party node may not perform
the agreement after receiving the user’s coins and steal the user’s
coins. The users do not have effective countermeasures.
– The Mixing Process is leaked by Intermediate Nodes: The third-party
node in this scheme understands the entire mixed coin process, and
the users cannot guarantee that the third-party node will not leak
the mixed coin process information.
In response to these defects, many improvements have been made. Bon-
neau et al. [55] proposed an improved decentralized mixed coin that can
be audited. Valenta and Rowan [56] designed a blindcoin scheme that
can prevent a third party from divulging the process information. Qing et
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al. [57] presented a blind signature scheme that use the elliptic curve to
improve privacy. In 2015, Dash [58], an anonymous digital coin, launched
operation. From an economic point of view, Dash solves the threat posed
by centralized mixed coin.
• The Mixed Coin Scheme based on Decentralization:
The program does not depend on third-party nodes. CoinJoin [59] is the
original plan. CoinJoin merge multiple transactions into one transaction
in which the relationship of the transaction inputs and outputs can be
hidden. For a multi-input and multi-output transaction, a potential at-
tacker cannot effectively distinguish the relation between inputs and out-
puts by analyzing the transaction information. The idea of CoinJoin is
used in many anonymous Bitcoin transactions, for example, Dark Wallet
[60], CoinShuffle [61] and JoinMarket [71].
The CoinJoin mechanism enhances the privacy protection capabilities of
all users. In a digital currency system, if only a fraction of the nodes
uses the CoinJoin agreement, the remainder of the users do not use this
protocol, nor do they use the original method.
The CoinJoin mechanism has many defects, as the following:
– As other users participate, it also faces threats from the other node.
– The information of each node participating in the mixed coin will be
exposed to the other.
– If some nodes violate the rules, the mixed coin may fail.
– The parties involved in the mixed coin transaction will be recorded
in the ledger.
Many scholars have proposed solutions. Ruffing et al. [62] propose a com-
pletely decentralized CoinShuffle. Based on CoinJoin, the CoinShuffle scheme
designs an output address shuffling mechanism. This mechanism can complete
the mixing process without a third party, and it can also ensure that the mixed
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coin participant does not know the relationship. However, the scheme is easy
to trigger denial-of-service attacks. Bissias et al. [72] designed Xim that adopts
a multi-wheel and two-square mixed coin agreement. CoinParty [73] adopts a
secure multiparty computation protocol to implement an improved scheme that
can guarantee the effectiveness of the mixed coin process in the case of malicious
operation or failure of some hybrid nodes. Monero [63] is a new digital coin with
a main characteristic of privacy protection. It adopts the ring signature mecha-
nism to realize the mixing process. Compared with other schemes, the process
of mixed coin in Monero does not require the participation of users; any user can
implement the mixed currency independently. Monero can effectively eliminate
the denial-of-service attack on the decentralized coin scheme and assist with the
problem of users’ mixed coin leakage.
Mixed coin is widely used in the blockchain digital coin. There are many
improvement schemes. We compare and analyze the schemes, as shown in Table
4.
4.1.2. Data Encryption
An encryption mechanism is a common scheme in the field of privacy protec-
tion. By encrypting sensitive data, users who hold secret keys can read the data,
and others cannot decrypt it, even if they have access to it. Encryption ensures
data privacy. In traditional blockchain, application data is stored in plaintext,
and any node can access the data. Therefore, using encryption technology to
protect privacy in blockchain must ensure that nodes can complete transaction
verification tasks on encrypted data. In addition, since blockchain transactions
must be jointly verified by all nodes, the impact of encryption mechanisms on
validation efficiency must be reduced.
In blockchain, specific transaction information must be encrypted. In digital
currency, there have been some protection schemes based on encryption.
• Monroe [63] is an encrypted digital currency. In traditional digital cur-
rency, the content of the transaction output address is the receiver’s public
key and address information, and the observer can directly determine the
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Table 4: Comparison of mix mechanisms in blockchain
Reference Protocol
Reliance
on third
parties
Risk of
theft
Mixed
coins
cost
Resistance
to DoS
Peculiarity
[67] Mix
√ √ √
Strong
The method is easy to
use and is the most
widely used.
[55] Mixcoin
√ √ √
Strong
The proof can be raised
to reduce the risk of
theft.
[56] BlindCoin
√ √ √
Strong
The blind signature
mechanism is adopted to
avoid leakage.
[58] Dash
√ √ √
Strong
The node that provides
a mixed coin increases
the cost of a violation by
paying a deposit.
[59] CoinJoin N/A N/A N/A Weak
No third parties in-
volved, so there is no
risk of theft.
[62] CoinShuffle N/A N/A N/A Weak
The participants of the
mixed coin do not know
the details of the cur-
rency.
[72] Xim N/A N/A
√
Strong
The method increases
the difficulty of DoS at-
tacks using a fee.
[73] CoinParty N/A N/A N/A Strong
The mixing process can
still function normally
even if some participants
violate the rules using
the secure multi-party
computation.
[63] Monero N/A N/A N/A Strong
There is no need for mul-
tilateral negotiation us-
ing the ring signature
mechanism.
coins’ destination. In Monroe, the output address is the new address in-
formation obtained by the receiver’s public key and the random parameter
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Figure 10: Ring signature diagram.
generated by the sender. Since the random parameter is only mastered by
the sender, the observer cannot determine the relation between the new
address information and the receiver. By generating different random pa-
rameters, it can be ensured that the output addresses of each transaction
are different and there is no correlation between them. There are two key
technologies in the Monroe coin, the stealth address and the ring signa-
ture. The stealth address is to address the problem of the relevance of
the input/output address. A stealth address, while ensuring that the re-
cipient’s address changes every time, makes it impossible for an external
attacker to see an address connection, but it does not guarantee anonymity
between the sender and the receiver. Therefore, the Monroe coin devel-
oped a ring signature scheme. As shown in Figure 10, whenever a sender
has to establish a transaction, he or she uses his or her private key and
a certain number of public keys selected from other users’ public key. to
sign the transaction. When a signature is validated, the user must also use
the other person’s public key and parameters in his or her signature. At
the same time, the sender must provide the key image to provide identity
identification. Both the private and key images are once dense to ensure
they cannot be traced.
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Figure 11: Zcash schematic diagram.
• Zcash [64] is a new digital currency, formerly known as the Zerocoin [74]
project. It is an improvement on Zerocoin. Zcash uses the promise func-
tion to encapsulate the source of each transaction and the amount of
several parameters, while using zk-SNARKs [75] to prove the transaction.
The proof process does not need to reveal relevant information; thus, it
can hide the value of the sender and even the inputs and outputs of the
transaction. Zcash is the best digital currency for privacy protection at
present, but its adoption of the zk-SNARKs algorithm is very slow; it
usually takes a minute to generate new proof and there is a bottleneck in
efficiency. As shown in Figure 11, the underlying implementation is similar
to the structure of Bitcoin, but Zcash is constructed using zk-SNARKs’
decentralized mixed coin pool, and with the mint and pour operations it
can perform in complete anonymity . Mint is the process by which a user
writes a commitment to a list for a certain amount of cash. The promise
must be a one-off serial number, and the user’s private key is calculated
and not reversible.
Similar to Bitcoin, the increase in the number of Zcash coin (ZEC) is based
on mining. The ZEC obtained by a miner can be tracked and recorded,
and its use also requires the signature of a private key. Therefore, if you
use the ZEC directly, it is similar to Bitcoin, and you can directly complete
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the transfer between each address; however, it is currently not anonymous.
The commitment made by the ZEC operation is not on the surface of the
user address but depends on the public key and one one-time random
number. When a user wants to spend (i.e., transfer) the ZEC, the user
must provide the serial number and a commitment in the commitment
list. In this way, the user can spend the ZEC without being completely
exposed. The user can also use the redemption operation to extract the
ZEC in the pool, the so-called redemption operation. The redemption is a
commitment to return to a ZEC similar to the previous one, and the miner
does not know which commitment was redeemed for the ZEC. Thus, you
do not have to transfer ZEC to anyone, merely place a ZEC in the pool
and redeem it; its source is untraceable.
4.1.3. Restricted Release
The restriction release plan is to remove data that are directly related to
privacy from the public database. Compared with the previous introduction of
the mixed coin and encryption mechanisms, this type of method is completely
guaranteed to ensure the security of privacy data. However, this approach has
additional restrictions on business scenarios and requires additional modifica-
tions to the underlying protocol. Common solutions include the following:
• Lightning Network and Raiden Network: The lightning network [65] en-
ables secure out-of-chain transactions. In the lightning network, the ma-
jority of the transaction details between users are implemented offline.
Only the first and last transactions must be recorded on the blockchain
ledger, so it can effectively protect transaction privacy. The Raiden net-
work [66] is a micropayment channel solution proposed by Ethernet. The
Raiden network is directly based on the lightning network and has been
developed. Because there are no specific field restrictions on the message
format of the Ethernet smart contract, Raiden can introduce a single incre-
ment number for the channel balance snapshot, which solves the problem
of identification and invalidation of the old version snapshot.
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• Consortium Blockchain and Private Blockchain: Traditional blockchain
applications are mostly public blockchain, such as BTC and ETH. In
the public blockchain application, anyone is free to be a member of the
blockchain network. The maintenance of the transaction data makes the
public blockchain application highly credible, but it also brings the threat
of identity and data privacy. To better protect privacy, blockchain technol-
ogy produces a branch of consortium blockchain and private blockchain.
Read and write permissions are open to nodes that join the alliance in the
consortium blockchain. Read and write permissions are open to one node
in the private blockchain.
4.2. Data Availability Protection
4.2.1. Network Traceability Attacks Protection
The blockchain runs on a network with privacy protection so that its topol-
ogy can be hidden, thereby preventing exposure of identity privacy information.
Onion network (Tor) [11, 12] is one of the choices. Onion network is an anony-
mous communication technology, which protects the privacy of message sender
and receiver and hides the route of data message passing through the network.
Another is Monroe [63]. In traditional digital currency, the content of the trans-
action output address is the receiver’s public key and address information, and
the observer can directly determine the coins’ destination. In Monroe, the out-
put address is the new address information obtained by the receiver’s public key
and the random parameter generated by the sender.
4.2.2. Eclipse Attacks Protection
Some researchers proposed several ways to solve the eclipse attack attack as
follows.
• Restricting Access: The network node needs to be authenticated. This
method can effectively prevent the incoming and outgoing links of the
node, so that the malicious node cannot access the blockchain node [29,
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30, 34, 77]. However,the approach will change the operational architecture
of the blockchain.
• Detecting and Blocking Malicious Nodes: The blockchain uses a malicious
node detection mechanism. Dillon et al. [78] proposesd an effective scheme
for detecting malicious nodes and finds that malicious nodes add them to
the blacklist, thereby limiting its further damage.
4.3. Data Integrity Protection
4.3.1. Double-Spending Attack Protection
Karame et al. [43] analyzed that the current detection mode uses a “listening
period”, which refers to the receiver detecting a collection of transactions after
this period to determine whether double-spending exists. The problem with
this approach is the attacker may delay the transmission of TRa because the
neighbor node will not broadcast detected double-spending. Thus, V cannot
detect double-spending attacks even after the listening period. The fewer the
number of neighbor nodes of the receiving node, the higher the success rate
of this attack. Another method is to insert observers into the network, which
immediately notify the receiver that double-spending has been detected. Only
three observers can effectively detect double-spending attacks, but it requires
additional costs. This paper proposed a mechanism to improve transactions’
forwarding function, which is to forward to the neighbor node when a double-
spending attack is detected. The detection rate of this mechanism is 100%, with
a false negative rate of 0%.
Ruffing et al. [79] designed a smart contract that allows payees to receive
payments asynchronously and impose penalties on double-spending attackers.
Eleftherios et al. proposed a new Byzantine consensus mechanism that short-
end trading time by 15 to 20 seconds and used collective signatures to make
transactions irreversible. George et al. [81] proposed a new decentralized cryp-
tocurrency RSCoin, the central bank maintains complete control over the coin
supply to prevent double spending.
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4.3.2. Mining Attack Protection
Miners attack each other during mining to reduce the other partys or overall
benefits. Yang et al. [82] proposed to establish a game model between two
miners to improve the profit of miners through game strategies. When a loyal
miner employs a pinning strategy, it can unilaterally set the payoff of a selfish
miner within the range of zero to r/2 − c (c is the computing power and r is
the expansion of profit), regardless of the selfish miner’s strategy. The selfish
miner’s payoff is proportional to r but inversely proportional to c. The loyal
miner cannot control his or her own payoff even with any subclass of the zero-
determinant strategy.
Miller et al. [83] proposed the mining alliance mechanism, in which the
members of the mining pool themselves did not trust each other, but submitted a
password certificate to demonstrate the work they contributed. Shi [84] changed
the consensus mechanism of Bitcoin, in which the value of N is established
according to certain rules to ensure the continuous output rate of Bitcoin. The
mechanism can improve dispersion and reduce the risk of 51% attack. Gervais
et al. [18] analyzed the various parameters of PoW consensus mechanism. They
designed the best countermeasures for double spending and selfish mining.
4.4. Data Controllability Protection
4.4.1. Logic Problems of Smart Contracts
• Errors in Encoding State Machines: The contract stipulates that in the
absence of a winning player, the coins should be returned to their respec-
tive accounts. In Ethereum or Bitcoin, when multiple parties send input
to a smart contract simultaneously, the order of transactions in this case
depends on the miner mining the new block.
• Failing to Use Cryptography: Cryptography is the first line of defense for
security protection. Application of cryptography is primarily to ensure
binding and hiding. These two major attributes not only ensure that the
transaction input is not tampered with but also ensure that the input
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information is not leaked. Before a message M is committed, system need
to compute a number that called nonce, nonce and message M hashed.
The hash value is then sent as input to the contract.
• Misaligned Incentives: To ensure the correct behavior of all players, some
incentives must be offered to ensure that players continue, regardless of
winning or losing in accordance with the contract. In this scenario, a time
limit can be established for the second player, and if the player submits the
input before the time limit, another player will be rewarded. In addition,
the game can also require both parties to pay a deposit in advance; if a
player performs malicious behavior, the deposit is forfeited, bringing a loss
to the player.
• Ethereum-specific Mistakes: For the Call-stack bug, developers are advised
to minimize the use of variables so that functions are as small as possible.
For the Blockhash bug, Luu et al. [16] solves the blockhash bugs allowing
smart contract access to more than 256 blocks For Incentive bugs.
4.4.2. Semantic Misunderstandings of Smart Contracts
Luu et al. [16] proposed to modify the operation semantics of Ethernet
workshops to solve the above attack vulnerabilities, for example, guarded trans-
actions (for TOD), deterministic timestamp and improved exception handling.
However, in practical applications, all Ethernet clients must be upgraded. Then,
a system called OY ENTE for detecting smart contracts is proposed, which can
be used to verify the problems in an intelligent contract.
4.4.3. Design Problems of Smart Contracts
Luu et al. [52] proposed a consensus-based computation protocol to solve the
verifier’s dilemma. They want to motivate miners to validate each transaction in
each new block. If the miners did not verify the transaction in accordance with
the stipulated protocol, they would receive few profits, and the honest miners
who verified all the transactions would receive rewards that are unaffected by
malicious miners.
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4.4.4. Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
• Privacy Preseration: Blockchain is a completely open database; everyone
can learn about each account asset and transaction record. Hawk [53] is a
decentralized smart contract system, and to avoid the transaction plain-
text details exposed in blockchain, Hawk programmers write smart private
contracts without the implementation of cryptography. The compiler uses
an encryption protocol (such as zero knowledge proof) to make the parties
interact with the blockchain.
• Data Feed: Zhang et al. [54] proposed a trusted link between non-
blockchain applications and smart contracts,which called Town Crier (TC).
It is a trusted link between smart contracts and non-blockchain applica-
tions. TC can help CSC deal with real world crimes (such as property
crimes) [85].
5. Future Research Directions
The data security issues of blockchain are crucial to the future development
of blockchain. Through the understanding and thinking of the research results
of many scholars, we propose several future research directions.
5.1. Data Privacy Protection Mechanism based on a Cryptology Algorithm
An effective privacy protection scheme is to prevent an attacker from per-
forming data analysis on the blockchain. However, this kind of scheme will
change the underlying architecture of the blockchain, which is not conducive to
use in the application. Therefore, it is necessary to design a scheme with high
versatility. The solution should consider the computing and storage capabilities
of the blockchain nodes.
5.2. Data Availability Promotion Scheme based on Demand
The existing anonymous attacks are of low accuracy and high cost; they do
not have the conditions for large-scale implementation, but the security threats
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of the data availability are universal in the blockchain, which uses P2P as the
underlying protocol of the blockchain application, causing the hidden problems.
In the future, we will focus on the appropriate access control policies to limit
node access and malicious node detection mechanisms to prevent information
leakage.
5.3. Defenses Against PoW Attacks and New Consensus Mechanism
Bitcoin’s PoW consensus mechanism requires very strong computing power
that have made mining by “normal users” impractical. The collusion of miners
or mines is very aggressive. An important research topic is methods to prevent
the collusion of miners or mines.
In addition, proof of stake (PoS) [86], proof of personhood [87], memory
intensive [88] and consensus alliance [89] have been valued by many scholars.
5.4. Verification of Smart Contracts
Smart contracts often have problems with mismatch between expected and
actual behavior. But the language of the verification tool limits its possibili-
ties. Non-Turing complete and human-readable languages need further research,
which is a future research direction. This is mentioned in [90] [91] [92].
6. Summary
With the development of blockchain, its application is increasingly exten-
sive, but the security of blockchain itself is gradually revealed. These problems
pose a serious threat to blockchain and its application. In this survey, we cre-
ated a comprehensive classification and summary of the security of blockchain.
First, we present classification of blockchain attacks. Subsequently, we present
the attacks and defenses of blockchain data in terms of the privacy, availability,
integrity and controllability. Data privacy attacks present the threats of transac-
tion and identity privacy. Data availability attacks present the threats brought
by network traceability and eclipse attacks. Data integrity attacks present the
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threats brought by double-spending, selfish mining, and block withholding at-
tacks. Data controllability attacks present the vulnerabilities of smart contracts.
Finally, we provided several open research issues and provided some suggestions
for the improvement of blockchain security.
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